Delta 2351: “Delta 2351, going around ’cause of American.”
Tower: “American 3161, where are you going?”
American 3161: “You cleared us for takeoff, 3161.”
Gulp.
At 11:34 a.m. Saturday morning, American Airlines 3161 was taking off from Boston Logan airport’s runway 27, headed to Charlotte. The Boeing 737-800 was cleared for takeoff while Delta 2351 from Dallas – Fort Worth was on final approach for the intersecting Runway 33L and cleared to land.
Delta’s pilots saw the developing conflict and initiated their own go-around, and simply told the air traffic controller they were doing it. Neither aircraft had been told to stop or go around before they acted. It appears the controller had lost awareness of the takeoff clearance already issued to American.
Aviation watchdog JonNYC was first to report the incident, sharing a replay of the flights and air traffic control audio:
— JonNYC (@xJonNYC) June 20, 2026
— JonNYC (@xJonNYC) June 20, 2026
I believe that issuing both clearances was not necessarily improper at they were given. FAA procedures allow a controller to issue a takeoff clearance before the required separation physically exists when there is “reasonable assurance” that it will exist when the aircraft begins its takeoff roll.
It looks like what was intended was:
- American 3161 would begin rolling promptly on runway 27.
- American would pass the intersection with runway 33L before Delta 2351 reached the protected portion of its arriving runway.
- Delta would continue to land behind the departing American flight.
This was an extremely tight squeeze. Twenty seconds after the takeoff clearance, Delta was only about 1.25 nautical miles from the threshold. At a normal A319 final approach groundspeed, that’s about 35 – 40 seconds to the threshold, followed by about nine seconds to the runway intersection.
Here, Delta was never told that American had been released for takeoff. American was not given updated information about Delta’s position. The controller continued describing Runway 27 traffic as holding and did not recognize that American was rolling until Delta announced its go around. There’s no pilot deviation here. Both planes were complying with their clearance. At 11:35 a.m. Delta was just 450 feet from touchdown.
About 30 seconds after American had been cleared for takeoff, Southwest flight 356 was cleared to land on Runway 33 Left behind Delta – and was told that traffic was “holding” on Runway 27. But American had already been cleared for takeoff, so the controller lost track of the American flight’s status.
Here’s the air traffic control transcript, with other flights excluded:
Tower: American 3161, runway 27, line up and wait, traffic lands 33 Left.
AA3161: Runway 27, line up and wait, American 3161.
DL2351: Tower, Boston, Delta 2351, NIMOY for 33 Left.
Tower: Delta 2351, Boston Tower, runway 33 Left, cleared to land, traffic holds runway 27.
DL2351: 33 Left, cleared to land, Delta 2351.
Tower: American 3161, runway 27, cleared for takeoff.
AA3161: Cleared for takeoff, runway 27, American 3161.
SWA356: Tower, Southwest 356, with you on the ILS 33 Left.
Tower: Southwest 356, Boston Tower, 33 Left, you are cleared to land, traffic holds 27.
SWA356: Cleared to land on 33 Left, Southwest 356.
DL2351: Delta three–uh, 2351, going around because of American.
Tower: American 3161, where are you going?
AA3161: You cleared us for takeoff, 3161.
Tower: Delta 2351, turn right heading 360, maintain 3,000.
DL2351: Right turn heading 360, maintain 3,000, Delta 2351.
Tower: American 3161, contact Boston Departure.
AA3161: We are switching, American 3161.
Tower: Delta 2351, contact Departure, 133.0.
DL2351: Departure, 133.0, Delta 2351.
American 3161 took off and continued to Charlotte, landing ahead of schedule. Delta 2351 landed 11 minutes after the go around, and still 12 minutes early. The same aircraft operated Boston to Raleigh as Delta 2283.
Air traffic control remains perhaps the single greatest safety vulnerability in air travel in the United States. I first wrote about FAA air traffic control staffing issues in 2004. There are management and procurement issues and basic maintenance strategy issues.
They’ve lit billions of dollars on fire with failed attempts to upgrade technology over the last two decades. And current efforts to modernize don’t appear to be fixing the actual problems.
I’d rather spend my tax money on a needless war with Iran /s
Thanks MAGA! (You boneheads)
Make
Algae
Great
Again
Well done, Delta crew. They may have avoided a real disaster with that decision.
@Fed up geezer – Prayers for you. You seem to live a angry life. Your only joy is criticize anything you can to blame on 47. Sad and pathetic.
Seems to me this is a large math problem a computer could easily handle….. Airplane speed, altitude, direction and target. A computer can keep track of 500 moving objects way easier then a human can. It’s 2026…what am I missing ?
(Not asking for autonomous planes….I still want 2 pilots…just looking for autonomous ATC)
Just listening to the ATC recording makes your head spin. These poor guys are WAY overloaded, it’s only due to their skill that far more incidents are not occurring.
Pilot with a major airline here. Excellent situational awareness from the Delta crew – and, quite honestly, what all professional pilots do at every airline every day, day in and day out. ATC does give us instructions and clearances – but every single time, the crew makes sure the clearances given are safe and makes sense, question them when they don’t, and take corrective action regardless whenever necessary. ATC does a wonderful job managing traffic 99.9999% of the time, but the crew in the plane is the final line of defense against an incident or accident for the few times ATC messes up. And this time, they did mess up.
@TexasTJ: This cadence and speed of the calls here is quite normal and routine, and relatively easy to follow. Any active pilot working for an airline could literally close their eyes, listen to the recording, and within a few calls, he or she would have an understanding of what planes are where, what the general flow of traffic is around the airport, anticipate the calls before they come, and could catch the error that was made. (I’ll explain it below)
With ATC clearances from the local controller (the tower controller, regarding landing and takeoff clearances) and when given a clearance to use the active runway and other traffic is or could be involved in the use of that runway, we receive info about the potential conflict. IOW – if told to “Line up and wait” we might also get “traffic will cross downfield” or “traffic will hold on the intersecting runway” or “traffic will depart prior to your arrival”. Every time there is another plane that we could see that might interfere with our use of the runway – ATC tells us about it so we know what to expect the other plane to do and we can be ready if they don’t follow their instructions. They did just that this time, too.
Check the transcript:
Tower: American 3161, runway 27, line up and wait, traffic lands 33 Left.
AA3161: Runway 27, line up and wait, American 3161.
American now knows to expect a plane to land on the intersecting runway and roll through theirs before they get a takeoff clearance (“traffic lands 33 left”).
Tower: Delta 2351, Boston Tower, runway 33 Left, cleared to land, traffic holds runway 27.
DL2351: 33 Left, cleared to land, Delta 2351.
Delta now expects the plane (American 3161) to hold in the takeoff position until after they land and go through the intersecting runway (“traffic holds runway 27”). All is normal here so far. Both calls are consistent with the expectation that Delta 2351 will land first, roll through the intersection of runways 33L/27, and THEN American 3161 will get their takeoff clearance second.
Tower: American 3161, runway 27, cleared for takeoff.
AA3161: Cleared for takeoff, runway 27, American 3161
This came before Delta touched down. American should notice nobody has rolled through the intersecting runway, and this clearance contradicts the previous expectation. They could have rejected the clearance, or assumed ATC changed plans. (FYI – plans and spacing can change – but if ATC changes plans, they will often add something like “Expedite takeoff roll – traffic on a 2 mile final Runway 33L”). Delta also should notice the traffic that they expected to “Hold” no longer is. This was the error that would stand out to any crew with good situational awareness, and it appears it definitely got the Delta crew’s attention.
The Delta crew probably watched the American jet accelerate, wondering if American would make it through the intersection before touching down. And upon seeing it wouldn’t work, they calmly went around. It’s what crews train for over and over – expect the go around, and only land if everything appears safe instead.
Again – well done to just another crew using great situational awareness to recognize a simple ATC error and make a recovery look routine. That’s all that happened here. It actually happens on rare occasions (and this has been true for decades) but with today’s on-line resources, it gets far more public attention now than it did in the past.
@Pilot Paul Thank you for your explanation from a pilot’s perspective.
Scary. Great job by the Delta pilots.
Thanks for the explanation Paul.
@ pilot Paul. ThanQ !
with go around in this situation (or any intersecting runways with simultaneous take off and landing) is there no risk of American getting high enough off the ground to be in Delta’s path?
@8453159
In this case, absolutely not – there was no real risk to American climbing into Delta. American 3161 would use about 2/3rds of the runway before rotating and breaking ground (well past the intersection). Meanwhile, Delta 2351 is also “taking off” – but they have a 200′ – 300′ head start in altitude, and are already at 140kts or so (instead of American’s zero) when they start the maneuver, so their climb rate begins at a greater rate also. So Delta would easily be many hundreds of feet above American as they pass overhead.
There are some airports where you DO have a greater concern with a routine, departing plane and a “go around” plane becoming a conflict. That would be any with parallel runways, especially ones closely spaced together and really busy (Atlanta comes to mind). If you look at the ATL runway diagram, a plane with a (routine) takeoff clearance from Rwy 9L could get really close to another that was landing, slightly behind them, on 9R – if the landing aircraft had to go around. We have to be ready for that in those places.
Another situation we can see it happened in Austin, Texas, recently between a departing Southwest flight and an arriving Fedex 767 (both using the same runway – a routine operational occurrence). Fog was obstructing the tower’s views, FYI. The Southwest 737 was given a takeoff clearance, but was slow to get started and rolling. The FedEx pilots recognized this, realized the runway wouldn’t be clear for them to land, and they started a go-around. The FedEx 767 out-accelerated Southwest as they flew past and overhead (closest point was estimated at 150′ – 170′) but if the Southwest plane had actually started a little earlier (but still late, and the 767 had still gone around) the Southwest 737 could have climbed directly into the 767 overhead.
One of the advancements over the decades that has enhanced airline safety is how pilot crews deal with “threat mitigation”. We talk before we depart the gate, and again before the descent/approach/landing, on what unusual situations are present, and could introduce a possible threat to this specific flight (Weather? Runway configuration? ATC constraints? Fatigue towards the end of a long day?) This was done informally in the past, but is now formalized as part of our checklist procedures. By anticipating these possible risks, we are prepared to counter them just as calmly and easily as the Delta crew did in Boston.
Paul,
in the situation such as you describe at ATL, if a landing aborts on a runway parallel to the departure runway which has an active departure on it, controllers often vector the aborted landing aircraft 10% away from the departure runway which can be safely done at ATL.
also, departing aircraft – even GA aircraft – have to fly the full length of the departure runway before turning to ensure landing traffic does not abort.
even in situations like you cite at AUS, ATC frequently will vector the aircraft that is aborting the landing to not overfly the runway.
ATC has thought thru these scenarios for each runway combination and and train it over and over
10 degrees, not percent
If only we had EU261 guarantees here … blah blah blah
@ Tim – didn’t mean to trigger you by mentioning ATL 😉
The threat of close-parallel runway, “one takeoff / one go around” potential conflict is not unique to ATL. You’ll find it in ORD, LAX, SFO, SEA, CLT, MIA, etc. Any busy airport with relatively close, parallel runways can see it happen.
Yes, you are correct about one part – go around instructions typically include an offset direction to fly for the aircraft going around. And many of the standard, published missed approach procedures are built with a slight turn away from the parallel runway for this very reason. But not all of them do, clearances on the radio get blocked, crosswinds can affect expected ground tracks, and pilots are at their busiest on a missed approach.
Here’s a specific example where the departure procedure is a track, while the missed approach is a heading – and the wrong wind could blow one plane into the other, even if both were flown precisely. See the LAX ILS 24R missed (Climb to 2000′ heading 251 degrees before turning right to track the LAX 260 degree radial) and the SUMMR2 departure off 24L (After a 251 degree track to DLREY, you get a five degree right turn and track 256 degrees, crossing DLREY at or below 3000′). One is flying a heading, subject to the wind affecting the course, while the other is not. And the “track” departure even turns you to the right, towards the other runway’s extended centerline! Those procedures, especially with a Northerly (from the right) crosswind, combine to make aircraft converge.
Furthermore, it’s easy to be off by a few degrees, and it’s therefore easier to make a small error that compounds into a bigger one at that stage of the flight (and that is precisely why a professional crew builds an anticipatory plan on what to do should it happen). In fact, I’d actually argue (from my own personal experience flying them) that the offset arrivals instituted at SFO, due to runway construction, will made operations there LESS safe than the old “close parallel” approaches if the restriction remains after the construction is complete. The precise reason is the landing plane gets set up to be right next to the departure on the other runway in the event of a go-around, so you greatly increase the risk of two planes in extremely close proximity to eachother – often with one unable to see the other – at a time when crews are the most busy. I have found it riskier, not safer, with the implemented changes there.
You were not technically correct when you said: “departing aircraft – even GA aircraft – have to fly the full length of the departure runway before turning to ensure landing traffic does not abort.” There’s nothing in the FARs nor in the AIM about having to fly the full length of the runway before turning. The most common element needed prior to a turn is to achieve a certain altitude, but that can occur (and often does, in jet aircraft) well before the pavement ends below you. You WILL find certain clearance gradients related to obstacle clearance along the full length of the runway and along the extended centerline, but you won’t find a mandatory “no turns prior to the end of the runway” law. To be fair, there ARE plenty of airports that institute that exact rule of “don’t turn early” for noise abatement – but it’s applied on a case-by-case basis only. Without it (and without some type of “ground track” specific departure procedure, like the one is LAX I described above) you can turn as soon as you deem it is safe to do so.
Finally – in the AUS incident, the controlled did not have the surface detection equipment available – so he did not know the Southwest plane was so delayed in starting their takeoff clearance. The FedEx crew even told the Southwest plane to abort their takeoff – but the Southwest plane chose not to. Point being, the controller didn’t know (and couldn’t see) that Southwest was so late in starting their takeoff, that he didn’t know offset instructions were necessary for FedEx. So he didn’t provide any. And the missed approach DID have a quick turn built into it anyhow. Despite this, the planes were estimated to get within 190′ at the closest point, and the TCAS alert was probably the biggest thing that prevented the midair (the alert caused the Southwest plane’s First Officer, who was flying that segment, to slow the rate of climb from about 1400 FPM to 500 FPM). [source: NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-02]
The point remains – the Delta crew in BOS did a fine job anticipating the conflict and managing it, and even avoided getting snarky or upset on the radio. I may have not been so reserved myself, so my hat’s off to them. There were certainly some reduced safety margins caused by the loss of situational awareness by the controller, but the Delta crew caught the error and made a great decision in response.
There’s some real TDS happening with America’s left.
Fed Up Geezer – you are a total idiot. You do *realize* it takes 3 years for an air traffic controller to be released for work, right? So — how about blaming this on Sleepy Biden & Mayor Pete, who failed to show up for work on a regular basis instead.
err 3 years from start-to-finish for training a new controller
“Thank you for coming to my TED talk”
– Pilot Paul
@haolenate
“Fed Up Geezer – you are a total idiot. You do *realize* it takes 3 years for an air traffic controller to be released for work, right? So — how about blaming this on Sleepy Biden & Mayor Pete, who failed to show up for work on a regular basis instead”
not to state the obvious but you’re ignoring that this issue is very long ongoing and “somebody” had a first term 😉
the US ATC situation is the result of a lot of idiots in DOT over MANY administrations…
Paul,
thanks for the lesson and I did not say that parallel runway procedures are unique to ATL but you mentioned ATL.
I have flown a GA single engine departure out of ATL on 26L and controllers do have aircraft fly the full length of the runway before the turn whether they need to or not.
and, yes, xwinds can cause drift from course but pilots are supposed to correct for it.
and, as you know, instrument landing conditions generally mean reduced volume precisely because the margin for error is reduced including missed procedures as you note. Many airports, including ATL, uses visual approaches even for commercial traffic to help move the metal – and it generally works.
you are right that the DL crew handled it well but I would say the controller did as well; no emotion, just kept going w/ handing the two planes off to departure.
If drivers on the highway were as well trained as even GA pilots were, we’d have a whole lot fewer accidents. Professional pilots and controllers in the US do an incredibly good job.
In none of the comments here or other sites, I don’t hear anything about how long you can wait before starting the take-off roll. I timed it. The ATC gave clearance for take-off. AA3161 acknowledged and repeated that they were cleared for take-off. I hit start on my stopwatch after AA acknowledged and it was almost 51 seconds before they started rolling. (There are a few sites where they published the real time actions with audio and all plane movement on the ground and air.
I was under the impression that if you aren’t ready, you tell ATC you’re not ready for takeoff. If you are ready, you don’t wait almost a minute to start rolling as airports are busy. Get the heck going for goodness sakes. Yes, I know ATC “should” have known, but I’d bet he thought the plane was long gone by then. What the heck is AA3161 doing for almost a minute when they were cleared to take off?