Southwest Airlines Dodged A Collision At Just 2,000 Feet — And The Only Air Traffic Control Response Was ‘Roger.’

On October 29, 2025, Southwest Airlines flight 1333 from Baltimore to Cleveland was cleared for a visual approach on arrival to Runway 06 Left.

MetroHealth “Life Flight 3” Eurocopter EC-145 was flying northbound across the airport’s approach corridor.

Hopkins Tower, responsible for sequencing both aircraft, saw the developing conflict and told the helicopter to maintain 2,000 feet and maintain visual separation from the inbound jet. The helicopter crew confirmed that they had the Southwest 737-700 in sight and would stay clear.

Moments later, the controller asked the helicopter whether it could pass behind the Southwest jet? Instead, the pilot replied that it would be “better if we go above it and in front of it, if we can.” The controller’s only response was “Roger.” No specific heading or altitude instruction followed.

That brief, ambiguous exchange set up the geometry for a near-collision: a 737 descending on final at about 140 knots, and a helicopter climbing slightly and crossing ahead at about 90 knots—both converging near the same altitude and point in space.

The two aircraft came within 0.56 nautical miles. The 737’s Traffic Collision Avoidance System issued a Resolution Advisory, instructing the pilots to climb, and they banked right to avoid the helicopter, which was now passing directly ahead of them. The Southwest crew notified tower that they were executing a go-around.

There was no patient on board the medical helicopter. It was just repositioning to pick up a transfer patient at St. John Medical Center, so it was not operating under active “MEDEVAC” priority status, even though its call-sign included “Life Flight.”

The Southwest pilots and their onboard technology did exactly what they should have: respond to the collision alert and break off the approach. The helicopter crew, despite reporting the 737 “in sight,” failed to maintain actual separation. The tower controller permitted the crossing to continue without issuing instructions even as the conflict became clear.

• Allowed a crossing of the final approach corridor at essentially the glideslope altitude and convergence point with an inbound airliner, relying on pilot‑applied visual separation.

• Accepted — via a non‑directive “Roger” — the helicopter’s plan to go “above and in front” of the faster, descending jet at short range, instead of issuing positive control (vector/altitude/hold) or coordinating delay of WN1333 with approach.

The helicopter pilot continued on a collision course and proposed to cut ahead and above an airliner on short final rather than pass behind. If unable to ensure separation, the correct response is “unable”, followed by a request for vectors.

There’s blame here for both air traffic control (essentially, “Traffic in sight, but we’re not going to do anything to avoid it”) and the helicopter pilot (gallows humor includes “Lifeless Flight 3” “piloted by two deer”). The Southwest crew did exactly what they should have done. Meanwhile, commenters see this as almost “DCA all over again” where an Army helicopter flew in the approach path (above authorized flight level) of an arriving American Eagle flight, ending in disaster.

It seems like continuing to allow “visual‑only” crossing of an active final approach inside a minimum distance at similar altitude is… unwise. Separation must be assured. And “Roger” to risky proposals should perhaps be replaced with affirmative directives or “unable” – if a pilot proposes to pass in front, answer with a directive: “Negative. Turn right heading 090, maintain 3,000.”

Meanwhile, priority handling for a Medevac – without patient onboard! – does not equal the right to self‑separate through conflicting traffic. When MEDEVAC is truly active, move everyone else but do it with vectors and holds, not visual separation.

(HT: One Mile at a Time)