A LATAM Airlines Brasil Boeing 777-300ER (PT‑MUH) from São Paulo Guarulhos to Lisbon on the evening of February 15, 2026 at very high speed. Airport fire and rescue responded. The flight was canceled. The aircraft ended up on a parallel taxiway and remained there for 14-plus hours before being moved.
- No injuries were reported on flight 8146, which makes this abort all the more fascinating to watch.
- There were drone disruptions that day, and operations at the airport were suspended, though it’s unclear if that’s related.
- There are reports of possible engine overheating as well.
The aircraft accelerated, began rotation (nose gear lifting), and then the crew rejected the takeoff, stopping near the runway end and vacating at the very end onto the parallel taxiway where emergency services met it and passengers deplaned via stairs.
LATAM 777-300ER rejects takeoff at ~178 knots… past rotation speed.. on runway 09L at São Paulo Guarulhos. Nose gear lifted, then max braking!
Glowing red brakes, burst tires , safe stop but taxiway blocked 12 hours, pax offloaded there.
Standard rule: After V1, continue… pic.twitter.com/d6cpr28cA6
— Fahad Naim (@Fahadnaimb) February 16, 2026
It had reached roughly 174–178 knots ground speed. You’ll see (3) speeds referenced.
- V1 (“decision speed”): the speed where the crew is committed to continue, because rejecting beyond it may not stop on the runway. It’s the maximum speed at which a rejected takeoff can be initiated and still be expected to stop safely. It’s also the minimum speed at which takeoff can be continued after an engine failure.
- Vr (“rotation speed”): the speed at which the pilot initiates the pitch-up (“rotate”). Vr cannot be less than V1.I’m v
- V2 (“takeoff safety speed”): the target climb speed after liftoff that ensures climb with one engine inoperative.
At high speed, the airplane’s kinetic energy is enormous, and stopping turns that energy into heat. You’re seeing brake temperatures soaring – and glowing brakes from the red hot metal.
The nosewheel lifting is consistent with the aircraft being at or near Vr, which is at or above V1. So this is described as rejecting takeoff “after V1.” Normally at this speed, with a serious failure, you accept flight, and climb away from obstacles.
We don’t yet know why the pilots of this flight rejected takeoff. I’m very much not a pilot and would love to hear from pilot readers on this incident.
There may have been indications of a serious engine problem that looked worse than a normal engine failure. There are reports of pilots telling passengers there was overheating in one engine. That could mean exhaust gas temperature too high, an engine surge or stall, actual engine fire or thrust rollback.
If it wasn’t just failing but pilots believed it was violently uncontained in a way that might cause structural damange, they might decide to keep the plane on the ground even though a simple engine failure with loss of thrust would normally mean continue and climb on one engine.
A rare, severe windshear right at rotation could cause the plane not to want to fly. We see the nose come up and back down. Or there could have been a major flight control issue that showed up only when rotating, although most configuration issues would show up earlier in the takeoff roll and with the video showing the aircraft pitching up it’s not obviously total pitch-control failure.
And given that there were major drone disruptions earlier in the day, if there was some sort of hazard ahead of them they might make an emergency stop.
So how did they manage to stop past V1? That’s the pint you might run out of runway. You normally continue unless there is reason to believe the aircraft will not fly.
- They may not have actually been past V1. It’s inferred from tracker ground speed and the nose-lift. But we don’t have computed V-speeds and wind.
- Runway available exceeded runway required. The stop beyond V1 becomes punishing on brakes and tires, but possible.
- Perfect piloting. The video shows immediate aggressive stopping. The earlier the reject call and the faster they reached max braking, the better the stopping margin.
- Good conditions for stopping. Headwind, cool temps, and a dry runway can help.
Pilots were clearly trading risks at this point. With a contained engine failure, continuing is usually safer than stopping. But for an uncontained failure, serious fire or major structural problem (which isn’t obvious from what we’re seeing) continuing could lead to loss of control, inability to climb, or catastrophic damage while airborne.
A late abort risks runway overrun at very high speed, brake and tire failures and fire, and a hazardous evacuation. Here they wound up mainly with brake and tire damage and a disruption at the airport. So the costs weren’t as significant as they might have been. Based on what we know now, it looks like the crew perceived a severe engine or system problem at or near rotation and chose the least-bad option, which wound up as brake and tire issues rather than an airborne emergency.
We really take for granted that every day over 100,000+ flights (passenger + cargo) take off around the world and everything goes smoothly.
The takeoff briefing is usually conducted by the pilot flying. However, the “aborts and abnormals” are briefed by the captain. There are three distinct segments that are discussed for the takeoff roll: low speed, high speed and after V1. At most US airlines, if the FO is flying, the captain takes command of the throttles after the FO pushes them up to takeoff power. The captain is the ONLY ONE that actually initiates the rejection sequence. Typically, if the FO is flying, the captain will state that the FO stays on the controls until he/she hears “I have the controls” from the captain. The “aborts and abnormals” are typically briefed like this, “Below 80K will reject the takeoff for any master caution or master warning. Once we get the aircraft stopped, you call the tower and tell them that we have discontinued the takeoff. Then make an announcement to the passengers that we have “discontinued” the takeoff and to stay in their seats with their seatbelts fastened. If we can taxi clear of the runway we will notify the tower and do so. Call the flight attendants and tell them what’s going on and then notify the company. Once we get squared away, call the tower and tell them whether we’ve decided to go back to the gate or resume the takeoff. Above 80K until V1, we will only discontinue the take off for the following “FIRE, FAILURE, FEAR OR SHEAR”…any fire or fire warning, engine failure, fear that the jet won’t fly or a wind shear alert. You stay with me to keep this thing on the runway. Once we get stopped, you call the tower. Tell them that we are stopped on the runway and to send the emergency equipment (NOT “roll the trucks”). Make an announcement to the passengers as before and call the flight attendants to tell them what’s going on. Once we get settled, we’ll contact the company. We will be going back to the gate so coordinate that with the tower when the fire marshal has checked us over. After V1, we will only discontinue the takeoff if we fear that the jet will not fly.” Now, this LONG WINDED brief is usually done on the first leg of a rotation. It goes into whatever length that the captain deems necessary but must include some references to the above information. After the first leg, the brief will be, “As previously briefed, except…” This the “boiler plate” version. The main things are the three segments, what we look for, what we will do and who does what. The briefing will later include airborne duties and responsibilities. This is hammered into the pilot’s brains. Guaranteed that EVERY check ride or recurrent training will include something that will cause the pilots to repeat this mantra.