A new government watchdog report out of the Trump administration lays out why air traffic control modernization has failed, but casts down on their own ability to fix it simply through force of spending an additional $30 billion.
For the past two decades, the Federal Aviation Administration has been trying to modernize air traffic control. The effort has been NextGen. And it’s been a disaster.
NextGen was supposed to transform how planes navigate and communicate, making flights quicker, safer, cheaper, and more environmentally friendly. A new DOT Inspector General’s report looks at how badly the effort has been bungled.
- NextGen was pitched to deliver $213 billion in benefits by 2025. Over time, the FAA reduced its expectations significantly. Now, they project just $36 – $63 billion in total benefits by… 2040, with only about $10 billion actually realized in the first 20 years of trying.
- Important technologies meant to modernize communication between pilots and controllers, improve weather forecasting for flights, and manage airport traffic have all experienced severe delays. Several of these core programs are now scheduled to be completed in the next decade. One of the most significant programs, intended to manage flight traffic efficiently at airports, has had its scope dramatically cut back, reducing the number of airports that benefit from 89 to just 49. Meanwhile, the cost of this program has ballooned.
- A crucial upgrade to the voice communication system used by air traffic controllers was canceled after years of delays, forcing controllers to keep relying on outdated technology first put into service 40 years ago. This cancellation means spending hundreds of millions of dollars just to maintain these old systems.
In 2025, the FAA will close the official NextGen office, even though many promised improvements still haven’t materialized. The FAA is launching a new modernization effort that at the outset is expected to cost more than $30 billion. But that effort so far doesn’t really address the FAA’s mistakes handling past upgrades.
The report identifies 11 broad areas of failure:
- Overly Ambitious and Unrealistic Planning. The FAA kept promising benefits that were too large, timelines that were too short, and projects that were too complex for it to manage.
- Shifting Goals and Requirements. Requirements kept changing, making it hard for teams to hit moving targets. Frequent changes in what was expected from technology and programs delayed deliveries and escalated costs.
- Poor Contracting and Acquisition Practices. The FAA relied heavily on large, decade-long “umbrella” contracts rather than smaller, modular agreements. This decreased competition, limited flexibility, increased costs, and led to weaker accountability. Poorly managed developmental contracts (totaling around $1.7 billion) lacked sufficient controls and oversight, wasting resources.
- Weak Program Oversight and Governance. Frequent turnover in leadership, fragmented responsibilities, and multiple reorganizations disrupted continuity and accountability. The organizational instability contributed significantly to missed milestones and confusion over priorities.
- Underestimated Technical Complexity. The FAA underestimated how complicated the integration of new systems with legacy systems would be. Technological interdependencies across multiple programs were not properly managed, leading to cascading delays.
- Insufficient Risk Management.b The FAA did not effectively manage risk at an enterprise level. They often did not anticipate or prepare for setbacks that could delay or undermine projects. Important lessons learned from setbacks were not sufficiently applied to future projects.
- Poor Industry Collaboration and Communication. After taking direct control of collaboration groups that included airlines and industry stakeholders, communication deteriorated. Airlines and other stakeholders became frustrated, as delays prevented them from benefiting from investments they had already made to equip aircraft for new technologies.
- Parallel Operation of Old and New Systems. Because the FAA failed to retire older systems on schedule, it had to maintain costly legacy technologies alongside their replacements. This duplication drained resources that could have accelerated new technology implementation.
- Lack of Real-Time Benefit Tracking and Adjustment. The FAA did not effectively measure the actual benefits of deployed technologies or adjust priorities based on updated data. As a result, limited resources were often poorly allocated.
- Inadequate Workforce Training and Preparation. FAA employees, especially air traffic controllers, were often not sufficiently trained or prepared to utilize new technologies promptly, delaying realization of benefits.
- Weaknesses in Cybersecurity and System Resilience. The FAA was unprepared for several significant disruptions, including outages caused by cyber issues and system vulnerabilities, highlighting gaps in resilience and cybersecurity.
In summary, the report paints a picture of systemic mismanagement, overly ambitious expectations, insufficient oversight, poor planning, and inadequate stakeholder engagement—all combining to derail the NextGen modernization effort and prompting the FAA to essentially restart with yet another major initiative.
I’m not sure they’re really getting at the crux of what’s wrong here. You have a bureaucratic system, and the regulators are also the service providers. They regulate themselves, which leads to very little accountability. Budget politics lead to overpromising and annual appropriations to poor investment choices even within the context of poor project scoping and broad mismanagement.
Crucially, though, the issues identified in the report aren’t really being addressed by the Trump administration’s new air traffic control system effort therefore there’s little reason to expect a different outcome.
(HT: Bob Poole)
Ah, so, a rare bipartisan topic… both sides fail at properly funding and upgrading ATC. Shameful.
Perfect example of why I don’t want government running my health care.
The current administration is spending money that could have been invested here. Think ballroom that looks like a convention hall.
We could have piggybacked on the Canadian system or jointly develop the Gen 2 version. That ship has sailed, at least for a few years.
Our system has a major failure point called GPS. Everything from navigation to timing synchronization relies on GPS.
We need modernization and redundancy
@This comes to mind — If you really don’t want this ‘government,’ maybe #47 should resign. (Oh, wait, you’re cool with an authoritarian, as long as He’s ‘your guy.’ Got it. Keep lickin’ those orange ba…)
How… ‘wE gOtTa GeT tHa GoVmEnT oUtTa Ma MeDiCaRe!’ …of you.
(Naw, man. We need a responsible government that functions properly to address the needs of its people.)
Well said, @Doug!
The problem is not partisan.
The problem is that ATC and other large systems that require heavy automation and a highly skilled workforce cannot be funded w/ the constant change in leadership and priorities that change every 2 years.
ATC has to be run like a business both for long term planning and funding and also for the short-term to deliver regardless of whatever other pressures exist.
Let’s face it – it was human error, not automation, that failed at DCA. Those “supplemental” fans are working.
Even the failure of communications affecting EWR cost no one any lives and the FAA moved pretty quickly to fix it.
And those of you that love to talk about Canada’s ATC system never bother to mention that US airlines have far better on-time than their Canadian counterparts.
US airline hubs at MSP, ORD and DTW have far better on-time than Canadian airline hubs in eastern Canada.
@Tim Dunn — Well said on this topic.
Any comment on the Delta ‘Nightshade’ incident?
Maybe Delta airlines can fix this
Americas answer to premium everything 😉