Southwest Airlines changes – basic economy, bag fees, paid assigned seats, expiring travel credits and a devalued Rapid Rewards program – are the result of activist investor Elliott Management taking a significant stake in the airline and pushing for its own board members. They wanted the carrier selling planes and leasing them back, leveraging the airline’s balance sheet to fund stock buybacks. They got what they wanted, and a short-term bump in share price.
- They began selling shares in December and filed an SEC schedule 13D on February 2 reporting that they’d reduced their holdings to 9% of the company (albeit a 10.7% combined economic exposure including cash-settled swaps and swap-call options).
- At peak, they had a 16% economic interest in a September 16, 2025 disclosure.
Now that their ownership interest has fallen, it’s no longer appropriate to exercise the same degree of control over the company, and two of their board members have resigned – and will not be replaced.
David Cush and Gregg Saretsky have informed the Company that they are stepping off the Board effective Feb. 23, 2026….in connection with the departures of Cush and Saretsky, the Board intends to reduce its size from 13 to 11 members.
The damage, of course, is done. Southwest had its first layoff in company history. Yet profits fell in 2025 rescued from losses by cheap jet fuel and accounting games with Chase credit card revenue.
You would not expect a strategy of taking the most financially successful airline in history, discarding everything unique about their business model, and copying financial laggards JetBlue and American – but worse because they lack AC seat power, seat back entertainment, functional wifi, first class, lounges (yet!) and ovens for hotel meals on board – to a recipe for success.
Southwest Airlines was insular and bloated. They were slow-moving. There are changes they needed to make to their business for a long time. For instance, sticking to just Boeing 737-700 and -800 aircraft (including the MAX) doesn’t let them serve enough markets or feed enough passengers. Not selling tickets through online travel agencies was a mistake.
- They were losing out on a lot of customers, for instance anyone with American Express points or Citi points booking through those bank portals. That alone had to be at least 5 to 8 points of load factor.
- And they were unusually dependent on passengers on one side of most of their routes. For a flight between Dallas and Sarasota, Savannah or Syracuse, instead of traffic being evenly split between passengers from both ends of the route they were heavily skewed to Dallas passengers only because that’s who knew to go to Southwest Airlines to search for flights. They lost anyone looking up flights on Expedia.
- Of course, once they add third party distribution they’re comparing their fares against competitors. And Southwest, with bag fees bundled, was often more expensive! And then there’s a natural drive to unbundle (basic economy), especially since the Department of Transportation rule requiring displaying airfares with the cost of a checked bag was enjoined by the courts. They hadn’t innovated, they were stuck in a tough spot, and they had no other ideas but copying everyone else – and Elliott Management didn’t, either.
They don’t fly long haul international and didn’t have partners, which meant they didn’t just lose the business of their customers when those customers flew abroad (and many chose to give other airlines their business because they could use all of their flying to earn status that way) but they also couldn’t offer Europe and beyond as an enticement to frequent flyers to get and spend on their credit card. So they were losing out on revenue that’s fueling profits for the rest of the industry.
Southwest needed to make changes but they didn’t need to give up what made them special. And though the airline will keep spinning that everything they do is successful (just as they did before making these changes!), their activist investor is selling off at what could be the top.
Sounds like the Carl Icahn/TWA playbook
Mission Accomplished!
At Oakland, the plan is clear: Raise fares on any market where competitors are absent. When demand drops, reduce the schedule. Rinse and repeat (Some shrinkage may occur).
If enough new customers who avoided open seating show up, Southwest wins. If not…
Prediction: 6 months from now, SW and AA file Chapter 11 (or sooner).
Southwest flights are still not available on the AmEx online travel portal – any indications that could be coming any time soon?
Maybe it’s just me, but this seems a lot like what Carl Ichan did with TWA. Not that he was the first, nor was he the last.
As everyone who isn’t a shill predicted…
So did Elliott make money on this whole expedition?
I don’t own any LUV stock, but if I did, I would bail now.
Would be nice to have them admit they screwed up and bring back ‘bags fly free’! Then upgrade the interior of the planes to the 21st century!
Picard
LUV stock is up 80% in the past year and 30% since the first of this year -just 40 days old. Not many stocks have done that.
AA can only wish it had someone that could see the potential in AA and invest in it to be able to force change.
WN will be fine. AA, probably not so much.
@Jean luc Picard — Make it so!
@Tim Dunn — Real companies don’t like ‘pump n’ dump’ schemes, sir…
Quelle Surprise!
They cooked the books to raise the stock price….and exit when they know the underlying numbers and future quarters are bleak….
WN does have an opportunity to back track on the bags thing….and basic economy….but i think the damage has been done…..
When 2 BODs immediately resign…shows elliot is selling and selling it all quickly over the next month or so….i see them exit thier position by end of april…..as fast as they can….
i beleive they bought the stock at around 30 dollars a share – as of today its 54….so they made money….ruined a company and thousands of employees lives over thier wall street greed….its why main street hates wall street…..
And yet…………….THEIR PLANES WERE FULL every frigging time I flew them. Funny how you continue to pimp the idea that they were failing by not having this or that or something else but then you say they were the most financially successful airline in history.
Maybe…………..just MAYBE they knew what the hell they were doing. It’s bad enough the Elliot morons shot the company straight into the crapper but you continually point out all the things they did/do “wrong” and still people fly/flew them enough for them to NEVER LAY AN EMPLOYEE OFF until Elliot put their stink on them.
The question still remains: will they do what they clearly need to survive in the long run and add a full-service domestic first class cabin with all that entails? It’s been talked about lately, but no progress so far.
I was *so* loyal to WN, largely since I was in Nashville in the ’90’s when AA was drawing down their hub, and WN was building up their presence. Sadly, I’ve lost my allegiance, now that they’ve converted to a “regular” airline, esp with imposition of checked bag fees. They have lost their way.
Let me guess… the private equity bros struck again?
To have a clear idea of how bad things are, you just need to look at their 10K carefully.
Advanced sales down 600 million year over year when that line grew at all 3 legacy carriers (500 million at United, 400 million at AA, and 100 million at Delta).
Loyalty liabilities short term up 200 million but long term down 700 million. So, loyalty down 500 million when the programs are growing fast at all 3 legacy carriers.
At the beginning of 2025 they said that bag fees were going to increase EBITDA by 1.8 billion and it ended up being lower than in 2024. Just a 1.8 billion miss!!
Management are always trying to put lipstick on a pig saying how great the changes are working, but is plain bullshit. They screwed up badly and now they need to resort to cooking the books through accounting games so that Elliot’s greed is satisfied.
The saddest part is that a lot of people are buying their BS, even airline analysts, but it’s written on the wall. Sooner rather than later the truth will come out and a lot of people are gonna be shocked.
Thevsimple fact is that Swa was let bed by both its customers, and more importantly, its employees. Before dispucablebsvheming Elliott. Before gutless puke Jordan. Open seating WAS cherished. Nags Fly Free was LIVED by both customers and flights ght attendants ( what an absolute cluster post Elliott and Jordan the carry on bag fiasco is now for the flight attendants). But now all that LOVE is gone. The employees, the customers, DESPISE what SWA has become. Employee morals completely gone. Fierce loyalty by both employees and customers has been destroyed. Any business that has this happen to them will not recover.’period. Even if SWA brought back its two most LUVED features, Open Seating and Bags Fly Free, the damage has been done. The complete trust of their employees will never return. SWA broke its
Word, its promise. Herb etched that promise, that oath, into stone. And Elliottvand Jordan crushed and pulverized that very stone. Then ceremoniously and with great arrogance public all flushed the resulting dust down the toilet, laughing as they voided the solemn and heartfelt promises,dedication, and vision of Herb.
Detailed study of the financial timeline with Elliot needed.
@Doc423, @Gary: I’ll take the other side of that. $100? Send a$20 downpayment to Gary via CashApp, Zelle, or whatever Gary specifies. Bet is dated from the date of Gary’s article until the same date six months later.
@Marco Marozzi Silvestri: And therefore, your accountant’s explanation for the stock appreciation described by Tim Delta Dunn above, is?
@1990: Did you notice that “1990” appears over ten thousand times in the latest Epstein dump? Were you remodelling the island?
-:)
@IsaacM – they didn’t for a year and a half. They finally did and immediately started cashing out.
I expect a merger of the two and rebranding to “Texas Airlines” or event “MAGAir”
The real question is why Wall Street rewarded them for messing up the company.
The recent interview on Airlines Confidential was pure coal posting by the two executives. You could tell they thought all the recent changes were doing nothing.
@Marco – If you want to use Southwest’s 10-K as a reality check, there really are a couple of places where the numbers look ugly on their face. The cleanest “advance sales” proxy is air traffic liability, basically cash collected for future travel and related services that has not been recognized as revenue yet. Southwest’s air traffic liability fell from $3.393B at 12/31/2024 to $2.830B at 12/31/2025, a decline of $563M. Meanwhile, the comparable deferred revenue lines at the legacies went the other way over their comparable year end periods: United’s “advance ticket sales” rose $857M, American’s air traffic liability rose $559M, and Delta’s air traffic liability rose $50M. So yeah, Southwest down while the others are up, but the magnitude differences are pretty significant and they matter in the big picture.
The loyalty deferred revenue discussion is even more interesting. I suppose the big ask is what changed in mechanics. Southwest’s total loyalty deferred revenue went from $4.849B (2024) to $4.334B (2025), down $515M. Under the hood, the noncurrent piece of air traffic liability (which Southwest ties primarily to loyalty) dropped from $1.948B to $1.219B, so down $729M. If you back into the implied current loyalty portion from those disclosures, it rises by about $214M year over year. So yeah, the net liability dropped by about a half billion, with a big shift from long term to current. But the 10-K also points to changes in the co-brand credit card arrangement that accelerated revenue recognition and reduced deferred balances. That is the key nuance: deferred revenue is not so much a scoreboard for “program growth” as it is a mixture of sales volume, redemption patterns, breakage assumptions, contract terms with the bank partner, and timing of when performance obligations are considered satisfied. A smaller loyalty liability can reflect accounting and contract economics even if the franchise is healthy. Some might say that is why using that number as a straight proxy for loyalty momentum is a trap.
On bag fees and “a $1.8B EBITDA miss,” I’d be careful, because it does not quite line up with what the filing actually shows. Southwest did implement bag fees for most fare products in 2025, and the company itself cites the policy change among drivers of improved results. On a plain GAAP basis, operating income increased from $321M in 2024 to $428M in 2025, so the idea that “results ended up lower than 2024 by $1.8B” doesn’t fit the audited numbers, even before we talk about EBITDA definitions and adjustments. If someone wants to argue the bag-fee move was supposed to be transformational and wasn’t, the rigorous way to do it is to isolate the incremental bag-fee revenue, subtract demand and mix impacts, then reconcile to unit revenue, unit cost, and margin progression, while separating one-time items from sustainable run-rate. That is how an industry analyst would pressure-test the story.
The way I see it, some headline balance-sheet indicators worsened for Southwest while peers improved, and the loyalty liability change is heavily influenced by contractual and accounting mechanics. The bag-fee narrative should be really be evaluated through a transparent bridge from policy change to revenue, demand, and margin. Not sure we can derive the same from a single slogan number.
And stepping back from the accounting and into my own recurring theme on this subject, the strategic gap is just as important. In a market where premium cabins drive a disproportionate share of revenue and loyalty economics, a single-class narrowbody model caps yield and limits access to high-value corporate contracts. The legacies monetize first and business class not only through ticket revenue but through loyalty, co-brand card spend, and corporate agreements that are anchored in premium product credibility. Without a true first class cabin that can compete for that customer, Southwest risks structurally under-indexing on revenue per available seat mile over the long run, regardless of how clean or messy any single year’s accounting looks.
The best thing Southwest had going for it was the first two bags free. Now that’s gone. What’s to stop people from. Jumping other to the other major airlines? Time will tell.
Can we lay some hands on that investor who has eff up the company?
The more people here predict the demise of WN, the less I’m willing to cash in my LUV shares after a 65% increase in 8 months. I guess I’ll at least hold them to make the gain long term. [If you saw the size of my LUV portfolio, you’d realize this is not bragging.]
“On bag fees and “a $1.8B EBITDA miss,” I’d be careful, because it does not quite line up with what the filing actually shows”
It does line up Mike Hunt. Let’s make it very simple. Let’s forget about EBITDA because depreciation and interest were basically the same in 2024 and 2025.
The day SW announced bag fees, management said that bag fees would be incremental to earnings by 1.8 billion in 2025. In other words, bag fees would push up earnings by 1.8 billion in 2025.
Now, EBT in 2024 was 598 million and in 2025 was 563 million. Do you see the 1.8 billion improvement anywhere?? Instead of increasing earnings by 1.8 billion in 2025, earnings went down 35 million compared to 2024. EPS is higher not because earnings are higher, but because shares outstanding went down sharply due to huge buybacks.
It’s plain to see. Bag fees were a huge failure because whatever revenue they got from the fees was offset by people stopping flying them. In spite of that fact, they kept buying their own stock (almost 3 billion) knowing this just to pump up their stock to keep Elliot’s pockets happy. So, there’s also dishonesty involved here.
very well said, Mike.
and let’s not forget that WN is “firing” alot of its low value customers that likely booked in advance for deep discounts and then raised fares and pushed yields higher. That will decrease ATL (air traffic liability) by booking less traffic far in advance and more close-in.
It is also far from clear how well WN fared in major competitive markets – but DL and UA both said they saw a stronger fare environment in 4Q2025 than they did earlier in the year. As NK wobbles and B6 cuts capacity, WN is bound to reap some benefit.
With all of the strategic changes that WN is making, it is much harder to isolate the competitive impact to WN.
I do think they will be fine and will be stronger.
There are far too many people that are wedded to the idea of what they are losing w/ WN’s changes rather than focusing on what WN needs to do to be viable.
again, the stock is already moving positively.
and I do believe we will hear about a domestic first class cabin by the summer of 2026. I suspect they had adding one as part of the plan from the beginning but couldn’t get 800 shipsets of first class seats for 3 or more years.
and I also think there will be a widebody order.
@L3 — I’ve been to USVI; I like that Ritz-Carlton on St. Thomas, but, no, never to… *that* island. Yikes. Disgusting. So, you think we’ll see any accountability?
@1990: Dubious.
@ Tim Dunn – Thank you.
@Marco – I respect that you are grounding this in the EBT comparison instead of leaning on adjusted metrics. But we still need to separate three things here: what management actually guided, what the income statement shows, and what can realistically be attributed to bag fees versus broader business dynamics.
Yes, EBT fell from $598 million in 2024 to $563 million in 2025, a $35 million decline. That clearly is not a $1.8 billion pretax jump. But that only constitutes a failure if management explicitly promised that bag fees alone would drive a $1.8 billion GAAP pretax increase for 2025 versus 2024. So it matters quite a bit if that figure was described as gross revenue at maturity, a multi-year run rate, or a specific year-over-year earnings delta. The devil is in those details.
Even if the $1.8 billion referred to incremental revenue, revenue (as I’m very certain you already know) is not earnings. Net impact depends on demand elasticity, competitive response, fare compression, incremental operating costs, and mix shifts. If passengers traded down or defected, RASM pressure could offset much of the gross fee revenue. That, of course, would point to pricing dynamics.
The proper analytical test is to construct a bridge from incremental bag-fee revenue through passenger revenue to operating income, while isolating fuel, labor, capacity growth, and one-time items. A simple year-over-year EBT comparison can’t really isolate the bag-fee effect with any unfalsifiable degree of precision.
On buybacks, EPS can rise even if net income is flat because the share count declines. The core issue is capital allocation judgment. While I’m not asserting it’s totally impossible, I’m not really convinced there’s a ton of evidence to assert accounting manipulation in this situation. On the other hand, there is ample room to debate strategy.
Many have commented that bag fees were a mistake; however, this fails to understand the reasoning (at least partially) behind the implementation, and this goes back before Elliot. Internal discussions (yes, I’m internal to SWA) of bag fees were born of displaying fares on online flight aggregators (Specifically Google Flights in 2024 and then later to purchase through Expedia, Kayak, etc.) While SWA didn’t charge for bags as a separate fee, some of the cost was built into the ticket price. Once you add bag fees and any additional fees at competing airlines, SWA is typically cheaper. Flight aggregators were comparing side-by-side rates, whereas SWA displayed an “all-in” rate, yet other airlines displayed ticket prices without any additional fees (such as bag fees). The average customer, who may not be savvy to this, would simply see SWA as a higher ticket price and book elsewhere. SWA loyalists were the main sources of ticket purchases. This decision is what we were told was the reason that bags-fly-free would need to be reevaluated. We were a bit shocked at how fast it changed, but none of us internally was all that shocked.
And if you think that the SWA transformation is complete, not even close. The complaints of no first-class product, ovens, lounges, and additional fleet types, all I can say is hold on a bit. A lot has changed in a short time, and these things will take some time. Stay tuned.
And bankruptcy?? What?? I would say you might want to check the books. We are a very long way away from that. The people running SWA are not stupid. SWA wouldn’t have been as successful as they have been if they didn’t know what they were doing. Nobody here is a fan of Elliot, but they did provide a much-needed kick in the rear.
“But that only constitutes a failure if management explicitly promised that bag fees alone would drive a $1.8 billion GAAP pretax increase for 2025 versus 2024.”
Mike that’s exactly what they did. I can tell you haven’t checked the guidance they issued when they announced the initiatives. It was not about revenue, it was about EBIT.
In the earnings call of 3Q25 an analyst mentioned the shortfall in EBIT and Parker said that it was due to the weak economy. Yeah sure, the weak economy only existed for SW then because the 3 legacy carriers were not showing such a big shortfall. As a matter of fact, United grew earnings in 2025 and Delta and American were basically flat.
The increased EPS guidance they offered for 2026 is based on fewer shares outstanding due to the buybacks and accounting games with their loyalty program (faster recognition of revenue). Now, faster recognition of revenue is gonna be positive today and negative later on in terms of earnings because the effect of the accounting change is a one-time item.
As to all the BS about business class, widebody order, and international expansion, you have to be disconnected from reality to believe that those things are gonna change their situation soon enough. They are not gonna get a single widebody before 2031. You need many years to build a competitive network of lounges and to reconfigure their almost 1000-aircraft fleet to offer business class. You need decades to build an international network like the ones the legacy carriers have and to have all the infrastructure needed to be competitive in the business class product.
Nope. It’s written on the wall. It’s just a matter of time. SW is in deep shit and way way overvalued.
Well, like I said in a previous post. I think the airline. Plus the flight experience. Is way better then when I first started working at WN in 2005. I have family members in ATL, BNA, DAL, SLC, PHX, and ONT. All flying WN to where they need to go. I am happy for these much needed improvements. When I travel personally. I try to be smart about what I bring. I try to choose direct. I want to be on time. WN is checking all the boxes for this Gen x’er. Plus for my adult children. The flyers of the future.
Most investors know not to invest in one stock. But a basket of stocks. So try not to give yourselfs a headache with airline 10k analysis. All airline financials are a roller-coaster.
All the best, and Don’t forget you can now fly WN to ANC from LAS and DEN. Starting June 1st 2026.
@Gary Leff — Know anyone in El Paso? NOTAM overnight shutting down airspace for military operation. Are we…invading Mexico to distract from Epstein?
So the entire investing public is wrong and you’re right, I guess?
This is their business model. This was a win. They take profits and move on. SWAs business model wasn’t working. Whatever you think of the changes, status quo wasn’t am option. I don’t know why you act like this is some failure or retreat.
Classic and pathetically predictable Private Equity move. Not much different from a smash and grab at the Channel store, just legal. Nothing new here but a few more narcissistic empty suits lacking any morsel of independent thought, creativity or social worth copying what has been going for the last 40 years.
@Mantis — Sorry, but, especially these days, the market is not rational, at all. (How are stocks in Asia these days?)
Pump and dump. That’s the new way of making money along with touting that AI can do it all. Maybe this works out for Southwest, maybe not.
Pump and dump. Share are up because of a high P/E. FWIW I’m shorting LUV so let’s see what happens.
Brian,
thank you for confirming what some of us knew from the day Elliott showed up which is that the initiatives that have been announced – and mostly implemented – were just part of WN’s transformation.
WN is in the process of becoming one of the big 4 US global airlines and is going to do in less than a decade what the big 3 built over 100 years – or mostly since deregulation since the big 3 were all predominantly domestic (very little international) 50 years ago.
WN had/has the resources including balance sheet to transform itself.
AA and UA are by far the most exposed to a reinvigorated WN and this could force AA into a much more painful restructuring.
And WN will claw back share and revenue from UA.
2026 will be one of the most interesting years in the US airline industry with the ULCC sector plus B6 hanging by a thread and AS trying to become a global carrier but outgunned by 4 much larger carriers.
@Tim Dunn — There you go again… plotting the downfall of UA and AA, while propping up WN. The best thing Southwest has going for it is its relationship with Chase. If not for that, I’d say, they’re gonna lose it all, because consumers are not pleased with these negative changes. Sure, fine, short-term profit, which was always C-Suite and private equity/hedge fund’s goal, but, long-term…yeesh.
Activist Investors are a stain on capitalism. I am more familiar with their destruction of retailers like Sears, Bed Bath and Beyond, and Toys R Us, but let’s see if their normal destruction happens on Southwest.
Advance bookings are down because of funds expiration and because fares are higher.
@nsx at FlyerTalk — You’re not kidding. Fares are outrageous. Trying to use my $500 Chase SW credit… In Economy, one-way, nonstop, NYC-Chicago starts around $30 with Frontier and Spirit; then, jetBlue, Delta, United, American around $80+; meanwhile, Southwest, LGA-MDW, starting… $200. Yeah, those planes are gonna be empty. But, like with AI-hype, the market is irrational now. Yet, folks like Tim will espouse a companies ‘greatness’ based on a temporary, fickle stock price… line. go. up. forever. *facepalm*
Southwest has trained me to check Frontier for every trip. If Frontier’s schedule fits, I fly them. They are my new first choice. With Gold status and Discount Den, it’s great.
For almost 30 years Southwest offered great prices and great benefits to frequent low-fare customers. Frontier is now alone in offering that package.
The Holiday meltdown of 2022 -23. is what got Elliott attention and they made their move in 2024. Elliott usually around 3 to 5 years will suck the life of the companies they invest in then toss them in the desert for the Vultures. Corporate Vampires in a sense. Southwest looks like they may escape the Octopus grip that Elliott has on them maybe by the end of this year. Glad to see that Ellliott roto rootetered most of the Corporate Stooges at The Palace.
@nsx at FlyerTalk — See. There it is. You are an actual consumer, who pays and uses these services. You’ve witnessed firsthand the negative changes over the years. The old guard (Herb) is gone. By contrast, there are some who frequent these travel blogs, and Seeking Alpha, apparently, who just care about stock price, and dissecting 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and 8-Ks.
Unfortunately, the larger carriers no longer really need to even care about passengers (or workers), because the entire game for them is now their points programs, not even actually flying the planes or selling seats. So, it shall be the era of banks with wings, for a while. We likely only get out of this tailspin with better regulations, because, consumers are relatively powerless, and the ‘free’ market (which, is, more like a captured market) won’t ‘do the right thing’ on its own.
no, 1990, I am not plotting the downfall of AA or UA. I am saying that both benefitted from WN’s weakness and WN will gain a piece of higher revenue from those two carriers’ customer bases. DL simply has the least amount of overlap with WN of the big 3.
and regarding F9, they just reported their 4Q2025 and full year 2025 results and they are just barely treading above the water. The biggest news is that they have renegotiated their Airbus delivery schedule and are returning some A320NEOs. The ULCC sector and B6 are not financially working and those airlines are cutting capacity.
AA and WN aggressively chased alot of that cheap discount traffic; DL filled its cabins first with higher paying traffic and then added on enough ULCC-type traffic in order to top off its flights. UA did the opposite – building its growth around ULCC fares in order both to help drive LCCs and ULCCs out of business so UA could grow its own domestic network.
The irony is that DL is benefitting the most from a reduction in LCC/ULCC capacity but all of the big 4 will benefit.
Air fares are heading up and there will be fewer but more stable and profitable remaining airlines.
WN had the benefit of having Elliott give WN execs a kick in the backside to position WN to participate in the restructuring of the US industry; AA has no such savior and the fact that they don’t probably says that the answers to turn AA around are much more illusory and may not be attainable. Having one of the big 4 weak is a very different environment than when AA and WN both underperformed.
@Tim Dunn — Which is why… if there are to be more mergers and ‘partnerships’ Delta is most likely to team-up with WN, especially in Texas, no? Hasn’t that been the play the whole time? You are right that airfares are up, everywhere, which is funny, because demand is also down, so… pipe dreams?
DL has the least overlap with the other big 4 primarily because of Texas, Chicago and Washington DC.
You can figure out who benefits and who has opportunity if there is any failure of any one of the big 4.
and the demand reduction is among the lowest air fares. If ULCCs and LCCs can’t make money at those fares, then there has to be capacity come out of the system.
WN is showing it is walking away from that business; AA is carrying a huge amount of deeply discounted traffic and they will be hurt if they can’t figure out how to replace that traffic w better revenue.
UA’s big growth push was built around taking low fare traffic. other carriers are failing but WN is turning itself around. UA’s growth strategy is very much in doubt if they had to steal low fare traffic in order to make it work.
I still think 2026 will be the year that the government meddling in the airline industry during covid will finally be undone by market forces.
I was a diehard SW flyer, but no more. The seating was okay by me, but charging for bags really got in my craw. Fares are horrible too. I just booked 3 people r/t from Chicago to Atlanta on Delta because they were $450 less between the 3 of us. You cannot take away everything that was good and still raise fares significantly.
Activists are scum!
Delta airlines welcomed me back happily and matched my Southwest status by giving me one tear up from my current tier. Already took my daughter to visit a college free, and I only went back 9 months ago.
I need an aisle seat but I don’t care what seat that is. Now I would care because most of the seats on the plane have been scrunched together in order to squeeze money out of us.
I rarely check bags, but bags fly free ensures that more people do check bags leaving more space in the overhead bin. Southwest has dramatically reduced the comfort of being a customer and I won’t be coming back. Sucks that Elliot got their money out with enough profits to go destroy some other company.
As a parent of two young children, I was all in on Southwest. Fares weren’t the most important metric; I’d fly SWA even if it was more so I wouldn’t be seated next to a kid hater. Now that’s gone, in addition to the other offerings that gave Southwest their USP. I see no USP anymore, just more of the same, which means it’s all down to fare, and a race to the bottom. What a waste of a good brand.
Granted, we’re but one family out of millions that fly WN. That said, we care nothing about checked bag fees or assigned seating. The two things we care about are Companion Pass (still there, at least for now) and no expiration date on travel funds for all fares (gone, now 6 mos for the cheapest fares).