On March 8, 2024 a United flight when off the runway when it landed in Houston. The report on the incident is out and includes cockpit voice recorder transcripts – including a troubling call from a pilot to his union rep before passengers are even evacuated.
Flight 2477 from Memphis to Houston was a Boeing 737 MAX with 160 passengers and 6 crew on board. When it was trying to exit runway 27 onto a taxiway, a landing gear separated. The captain later said the runway looked dry. The first officer remembered it looking wet.
On touchdown, everything looked normal at first. About 5 seconds later, the captain manually stowed the speedbrake handle. That knocks the autobrakes offline. From there, stopping performance depends much more on manual braking technique and remaining stopping tools.
United Airlines Flight 2477 (Boeing 737 MAX 8) has suffered a left main landing gear collapse after trying to taxi off runway 27 at IAH airport in Houston, Texas. It’s unclear whether the gear collapsed as a result running off the taxi way or it failed. Another bad day for United… https://t.co/2GrKI4wRGS pic.twitter.com/uLxrpdrUYc
— Thenewarea51 (@thenewarea51) March 8, 2024
They stepped down the stopping help while still moving fast. The captain realized the plane is not going to comfortably stop in a straight line with what’s left of the runway. He tries to turn off the runway onto a taxiway, and applies very heavy braking while turning.
The aircraft slid off the paved surface into soft, muddy grass. The left main gear sank and struck a concrete electrical manhole and broke away. The plane came to rest partly on the grass.
Someone sends: pic.twitter.com/ELX2oTACQy
— JonNYC (@xJonNYC) March 8, 2024
One Mile at a Time flags a video which includes the cockpit voice recording, which captured audio after the event – including cell phone calls.
The captain made a call to his union, ALPA, that lasted about 30 seconds. He was advised not to “say another word” on the plane (presumably because of the voice recorder) and they’d connect him to the safety committee chair.
Captain: “Listen, I just ran off the end of runway 27.”
ALPA: “You did this just now?”
Captain: “Yeah, we’re sitting here in the airplane, left main gear collapsed, and we’re deplaning right now in the buses.”
ALPA: “Okay, don’t say another word in the airplane.”
Captain: “Okay, all right.”
That second call began asking about privacy, and advising on how to proceed.
Captain: “We’re sitting both in the cockpit right now.”
ALPA: “Okay, door closed?”
Captain: “Door’s closed, the APU is off because the flight attendants told us there was a fuel leak. We’re on the emergency power.”
ALPA: “Hey guys, just so you know who I am, I’m the Central Air Safety Committee Chair for ALPA. Just gotta let you know just take a deep breath. It’s okay, relax. Things like this happen. Not a good week for United. We just lost a tire going through the parking lot, so things like this happen. So go through your procedures, make sure you cover all your items, follow your evacuation checklist.”
Captain: “All right, that’s done.”
ALPA: “Okay, so now you just secured everything, you’re done at that point. You guys should now start to gather your, I want you to have a plan, you’re gonna travel to the chief pilot’s office, do not do anything else, you’re not talking to anybody. You’re gonna go down there, they’re probably going to make you do a drug and alcohol test, right? That’s standard.”
Captain: “Yeah.”
ALPA: “Okay, they’re gonna ask you questions. Your response is gonna be very clearly, ‘I’m a little rattled right now, let me gather my thoughts and we’ll file the appropriate reports in due time.’ I don’t want you guys saying anything right now. Catch your breath, right? Your career is intact, everything’s gonna be fine. This will be a flight safety investigation. You will be completely protected, and after about a month, you’ll go back and fly the line again, and this will be over and done with, okay.”
Captain: “Yeah, the only other thing is that I don’t really want to board the bus with the passengers, so I gotta figure out a way how to get to the terminal.”
ALPA: “Okay, what I want you to do is to call maintenance on another line and tell them to send a truck or a vehicle there to take you and the first officer to the chief pilot’s office.”
The ALPA safety chair directs that flight attendants congregate on the opposite side of the aircraft — and this is explicitly phrased as “where people from the terminal cannot see.” And he advises following checklists. The ALPA chair predicts drug and alcohol testing and instructs a canned response to questions, an ‘I’m rattled; I’ll file appropriate reports later.’
He emphasizes don’t talk to anyone, go straight to the chief pilot’s office, and reassures the captain his career will be fine.
The captain asks how to avoid boarding the bus with passengers, and gets the advice to call maintenance to send a vehicle to take the crew to the chief pilot’s office.
Interpreting this in the light most favorable to the captain and the union, “stop talking” is predictable counsel after an incident. People speculate and misstate facts. There are career risks involved, so it’s rational to prefer representation-driven messaging over unfiltered honesty, even where safety is involved.
“Follow procedures” is also good advice. The chair pushes the cockpit to run checklists and treat the reported fuel leak conservatively. However,
- The flight attendant instruction is explicitly framed around visibility (“where people from the terminal cannot see”). It’s managing optics, not the hazard. Even if there’s a legitimate “stay opposite the leak” safety rationale, that’s not how they were framing it.
- Coaching a canned ‘I’m rattled, will report later’ and ‘don’t talk to anyone’ can degrade the speed and quality of early fact capture.
- Captain understandably wanted to avoid confrontation with passengers, but the “no bus with passengers” priority while the evacuation itself is still underway and there’s a fuel leak is really quite something.
A first instinct for self-protection over safety is natural but it also lays bare what’s happening at the union that presents itself as safety over all else.
Perhaps far more importantly, the incident is an important illustration of the conundrum facing most policies involving pilots. We want a culture where pilots can talk openly and candidly about safety, file reports, and improve the system. When a pilot has an impairment, we want them to be able to share it. And that means not disciplining them when they do. At the same time, that open communication can flag issues that ought to keep someone out of the cockpit. But the moment you do that, you create the self-preservation incentive that undermines safety.
737 MAX 8 goes into ditch at IAH
byu/KarurosuSeruna inaviation
There are all sorts of programs airlines and agencies have to address this challenge. For instance, airlines have ASAP (Aviation Safety Action Program). There’s the NASA ASRS confidential reporting of aviation safety issues to NASA. Carriers have Safety Management Systems and they do Line Operations Safety Audits.
But we also operate in a world where participants assume statements will be used against them, so they behave defensively, even while the airplane is still sitting in the grass. And they aren’t actually wrong to think that.
Gary: In the context of this specific incident, your comments about confidential reporting of aviation safety issues do not seem to apply. In the clear finding by the NTSB, the sole reason for the high-speed excursion into the grass related to the incorrect action by the captain in moving the speedbrake lever to the “down and locked” position (thus disabling the safety-critical autobrake system). Candidly, the captain’s actions easily could have led to fatalities (consider Jeju Flight 2216 just over a year ago, that killed all passengers and all but two of the crew by striking a concrete barrier at the end of a runway). There is zero chance that I would want to be a passenger on an aircraft flown by this captain, and I’m disappointed in your defense of the captain and union on this.
Gary, you’re late. Recycling Ben’s post, eh? Anyway, it’s no different than consulting with counsel. Attempts to vilify this pilot or unions more broadly is misguided at best. Accidents happen; glad everyone was alright here. Investigators determine the facts; insurance helps cover the aircraft. Be safe out there, everyone!
He was instructed with lawyer type of instructions. Pretty much what I would expect.
Safety first. After an airline accident, and before you are tested for drug and alcohol intoxication, or speaking with the chief pilot, the pilot-in-command should call the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) using the stored speed dial number on your cell phone for additional advice. Don’t forget to protect your privacy because the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) will store a minimum of two hours of all spoken words in the flight deck.
Sounds as though the pilot’s have good union representation. As it should be.
@TexasTJ: NASA immunity doesn’t apply to intentional acts. Stowing the speedbrakes wasn’t done to intentionally cause the aircraft to exit the runway. ASRS/FSAP protections should apply but there will still be repercussions for the crew.
As far as the Autobrakes, the fact that they rolled to the near end of the runway tells me they were almost certainly set to 1. Any manual braking other than very light pressure would have the aircraft stop sooner. The ATC recordings show there was no indication that the crew (or ATC) were concerned about the aircraft leaving the paved surface. I don’t think the autobrakes releasing was a factor. They were going too fast to make a turn on a slick runway and didn’t realize how slick the surface was until it was too late. This is a common occurrence at the end portion of the runway.